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THE OUTER SPACE, ANTARCTIC AND
PELL TREATIES--SIMILAR SOLUTIONS
TO A COMMON PROBLEM
Io

INTRODUCTION

During the past two decades, there has been an increasing
interest in those rules of international law governing the
This is due
exploration and exploitation of ocean space. 1
primarily to the recent upsurge of technological developments
Rivalry between the
among the highly industrialized nations. 2
U.S.S.R. and the United States has spurred these two countries,
in particular, to a high level of competition in the field of
The less highly developed countries
ocean mining technology.
are also interested in exploiting the ocean space in order to
bolster their own economies.
The traditional principle governing the law of the oceans
The concept of freedom of the
has been freedom of the seas. 3
sea has always been subject, however, to a nation's sovereign
4
control over portions of the ocean adjacent to its shores.
In recent years, however, there has been a change in this
principle, and many nations, including the United States, have
extended claims of sovereign control to other parts of the
ocean.
In the eighteenth century, the international rule as to
territori&l waters was that they extended only as far as the
which would enable that
range of the costal state's cannon
At that time, the
nation to assert control over intruders.
effective distance of a cannon-shot was about three nautical
Today, however, there seems to be no agreement among
miles. 5
nations as to what the rule delimiting territorial waters is.
A number of nations have claimed six and twelve mile limits.
Many nations have claimed jurisdiction over adjacent portions
of the oceans out to two hundred miles for particular purposes
iThe Truman Proclamation of 1945 stated that the United
States had "jurisdiction and control" over its adjacent conPresidential Proclamation No. 2667, 59 Stat.
tinental shelf.

884 (1945). Due to the varied claims of right over the continental shelf, the International Law Commission was created by
the U.N. General Assembly to assist in the development and
codification of international law,
2 Goldie, The
Contents of Davy Jones' Locker--A Proposed
Regime for the Seabed and Subsoil, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 66
(1967).
3 M.

McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEANS 2

5-Walker, Territorial Waters:
BRIT. Y. B. INT'LLAW 210.

(1962).

The Cannon -Shot Rule, 1945

such as fishing rights. 6 The International Law Commission has
reported that there is no uniformity in international practice
as to the territorial claims over adjacent portions of the
ocean.
It is in this climate of disorder and confusion that nations
are now beginning to move into the high seas to exploit its
mineral wealtho 8 Clearly there is a need for order; but'it
is
equally clear that existing international rules are inadequate to
maintain public order in this area.
On March 5, 1968, Senator-'Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island
introduced a draft Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space
(hereinafter called the Pell Treaty).9

The Pell Treaty attempts

to establish international order by developing new principles for
the exploitation of ocean resources. This article will examine
the Pell Treaty in light of two earlier treaties which dealt with
similar problems--the Antarctic Treaty of December 1, 1959,10 and
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies of January 27, 1967,11 (hereinafter
called the Outer Space Treaty).
II

THE BACKGROUND

The subject matter of the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties
is similar in many respects to that of the Pell Treaty. The
basic problem in all of the treaties involves the reconcillation
of national claims over territories which had previously been
inaccessible, but which have now been made or will be made exploitable due to technological advances. Added difficulties ari ke
6The United States extended its exclusive fishing rights from
three to twelve miles. 16 UoS.C.A. §§ 1091-94 (Supp. 1967).
Certain Latin American countries claim jurisdiction over a "continental shelf" up to 200 miles. See Garaioca, The Continental
Shelf and the Extension of the Territorial Sea, 10 MIAMI L.Qo
490, 494 (1956).
71956 INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION REPORT, art. 3 of ARTICLES
ON LAW OF SEA.
8 "The technological
frontier, pushed forward by the explosion
of interest in the ocean sciences during the last few years, is
now advancing into the deep sea beyond the limits of the geographical shelves, and the pace may be expected to accelerate in the
next decade." Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62
AM. J. INT'L L. 641 (1968).
See also Into the Sea, LIFE, Oct. 4,
1968 at 64.
9S. Res. 263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
1 0 See 54
AM. .J INT'L L. 477 (1960).
iS-ee 61 AM J. INT'L L. 644 (1967).

where these territories can be effectively exploited by only a
few of the most technologically advanced nations. Because of
the similarity of the problems involved much can be gained by
examining the principles and fundamental sources embodied in the
Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties and by noting the several
important similarities and differences between the regions dealt
with in those treaties and ocean space.
A.

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY

The first landing on the Antarctic mainland was made by
Captain John Davis on February 7, 1821. From time to time for
the next 130 years1 various expeditions were sent out by a
At the beginning of the 20th century, the
number ot nations.
exploring nations began to assert national claims over parts of
the Antarctic territory. The resulting competition and friction,
especially among certain Latin American nations, 1 3 prompted the
United States to take the initiative in calling a conference
looking to a possible internationalization of the Antarctic
region. The Washington Conference on Antarctica was called in
195914 and resulted in the Antarctic Treaty, signed by twelve
countries.15
The governing principles of the treaty are set out in the
(1) the desire that all nations use
preamble. They include:
and that the use shall be free
purposes
Antarctica for peaceful
(2) the conviction that in the
from international discord;
interest of science and progress of all mankind there shall be
freedom of scientific investigation and international coand (3) the desire that the principles and purposes
operation;
found in the Charter of the United Nations be furthered.
The Articles of the Treaty codify these principles into
certain specifics. Article II provides that freedom of
scientific investigation shall continue. Article III provides
for the exchange of scientific information, personnel, and
data. Nuclear explosions and disposal of nuclear waste are
prohibited in Article V. Article IV provides that "no new claim,
or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica shall be asserted.... " Because of the previous
1 2 For a detailed account, see Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement
of 1959, 54 AM. Jo

INT'L L. 349

(1960).

- 'iplomatic
and military temperatures were rising so
rapidly in the 'South American Quadrant' that Britain, Chile,
and Argentina found it expedient to arrive at an understanding...
Competition had already driven these three claimants to maintain
'continuous occupation' of a number of bases with military and some
personnel." Id. at 352.
scientific
1 4 See 41
DEP'T STATE BULL. 650 (1959).
1 Signed by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, French
Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and the United States
of America.

A

claims of sovereignty over portions of the Antarctic territory,
Article IV further provides that nothing in the treaty shall be
interpreted as a renunciation of a previous claim, a renunciation
of a previous basis for a claim, or a prejudice regarding a
Contracting Party's recognition or non-recognition of any other
state's right or claim to territorial sovereignty. Article VIII
provides that observers, scientific personnel, and their staffs
"shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting
Party of which they are nationals... ''16 Finally, Article XI
provides that a dispute between Contracting Parties shall be
settled by consultation, arbitration or any other peaceful means
which the disputants choose. If this fails, the dispute may, with
the consent of the disputants, be referred to the International
Court of Justice.
B.

THE OUTER SPACE TREATY

The Outer Space Treaty was the result of about ten years
of discussion and negotiation, starting with the Ad Hoc Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space created by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 13, 1958. The Treaty embodies the
principles of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
1721 of December 20, 1961, Resolution 1962 approved on December 13,
1963, and Resolution 1884 of October 17, 1963.17 The first resolution proclaimed that international law, including the United
Nations Charter, applied to outer space and that the celestial bodies
are free for exploration and use by all nations and are not subject
to national appropriation. The second resolution called upon nations
to refrain from placing nuclear or -mass destruction weapons into
orbit. The third resolution declared that a state is internationally
responsible for its activities in-outer space and for the activities
of its nationals and organizations and that the state has juris18
diction over objects and personnel it launches into outer space.
The Outer Space Treaty also has provisions comparable to
those in the Antarctic Treaty. Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty provides for the freedom of all states to explore outer
space and the celestial bodies; Article IX provides for cooperation and mutual assistance; Article IV prevents a nation
1 6 This

is similar to the Roman law concept that a person
carries his own state's law with him wherever he goes. The
concept would seem to be necessarily applicable in the Antarctic
where sovereignty over territory is not allowed. Nonetheless, this
could prove to be a point of friction where a nation tries to
exercise jurisdiction over a person inside territory claimed by
that nation prior to the Treaty.
17 Beyer, Background
Aspects of a Treaty Governing the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 38 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 320 (1966-67).
18 Ido
at 320-323.

from orbiting nuclear or mass destruction weapons. Article VIII
provides for jurisdiction of the State Party over objects and
personnel launched by it into space. Article VI provides that a
State is responsible for activities of its nationals even though
the national may not be acting for his state. Finally, article
XIII provides for the settlement of "practical questions" by
"appropriate international organizations" or with "states
members of that international organization, which are Parties
to this Treaty."
The Outer Space Treaty, however, went a step further than
the Antarctic Treaty toward internationalizing inaccessible
areas for the purpose of exploitation for the benefit of all men.
Since there were no prior claims of sovereignty on the celestial
bodies, there was no need that the treaty allow for prior
sovereign claims as did the Antarctic Treaty. Therefore, Article
II prohibited any claims of national sovereignty by any means.
III.

THE PELL TREATY--A COMPARISON

The Pell Treaty was introduced by Senator Pell on March 5,
1968.19 The Treaty embodied principles set out in Senate
Resolution 186 which had been introduced by Senator Pell on
Novembdr 17,' .1967.20
Although the Pell Treaty, if adopted, would be a significant
step forward from the Outer Space Treaty and its predecessor, the
Antarctic Treaty, it is basically structured on the broad concepts and principles of the Outer Space 2 1 and Antarctic Treaties.
These principles, which are set out under Parts I and IV of the
Pell Treaty respectively entitled General Principles Applicable
to Ocean Space and Use of Seabed and Subsoil of Ocean Space for
19S. Res. 263, 90th Congo, 2d Sess. (1968). The creation
of this treaty was somewhat unusual in that it was initiated in
the Senate as a resolution advising the Executive to enter into
negotiations with other countries, Normally a proposed treaty
will emerge from the Executive branch and go to the Senate for its
advice and consent before ratification by the Executive.
2 0 S. Res. 186, 90th
Congo, 1st Sess. (1967). The principles
outlined included a provision for the peaceful use of the ocean,
sea bed, and subsoil, a prohibition of the disposal of radioactive
waste material in ocean space (which was later modified in
Article 27 of the Treaty to allow such disposal, subject to the
safety regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency in
consultation with the licensing authority created by Part III,
Article 12), and establishment of a Sea Guard to enforce the
rules and principles of the Treaty.
2 1 Borgese, The Ocean
Regime at 2, in 1 A CENTER OCCASIONAL
PAPER, (October 1968).

(1) the freedom of all nations to
Peaceful Purposes Only, are:
exploration, and exploitation
investigation,
engage in scientific
(2) the prohibition against national appropriation
of ocean space;
(3) state responsibility for its
occupation;
or
sovereignty
by
(4) mutual assistance, cooperation, and aid
nationals' activities;
(5) use of ocean space only for peaceful
to others in distress;
(6) and the prohibition of nuclear or mass destruction
purposes;
weapons. Part I, Article 4 provides that the exploration and
exploitation ocean space will be conducted under the rules of
international law and the United Nations Charter. Part II of the
Pell Treaty deals with the use of the water and natural resources
found in the water of ocean space. Article 10, Part II provides
that all parties have a right to fish and mine in the water. They
may use the water for transportation and "aquaculture." This can
be likened to the exploitation of the medium through which one must
travel to reach the celestial bodies--outer space, but there are no
similar provisions in the Outer Space Treaty relating to the exploitation of the vacuum of outer space, probably because,' at this
time, nothing exploitable has been found there. The Antarctic
situation is different from either of the above in that the land
mass is the medium over which the explorers travel and is at the
same time the exclusive subject of the exploration. Therefore,
there was no need to deal separately with the medium of travel
and the subject matter in the Antarctic Treaty as there was in
the Pell Treaty. Consequently, while the Outer Space Treaty and
the Antarctic Treaty address themselves solely to the question of
exploration of outer space and the Antarctic respectively, they
do not deal with the zxploitation of natural resources which is
the primary concern of the Pell Treaty. This provision in the
Pell Treaty, then, may well set a precedent if, in the future, it
is found that outer space and Antarctica may be profitably
exploited in some presently unknown way.
The subject matter of Part V of the Pell Treaty is the disposal of radioactive waste material in ocean space. Unlike the
Outer Space Treaty or the Antarctic Treaty, the Pell Treaty
permits the disposal of radioactive waste in ocean space; but
disposal is subject to safety regulations to be prescribed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency in consultation with the
licensing authority. Such disposal is also subject to "any other
international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy,
including the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which
22
all of the States Parties to the [Pell] Treaty are parties...
Part VIII of the Pell Treaty retreats from the prevailing
but controversial concept of criminal law jurisdiction in international law. It provides that all nationals are subject only
2 2 Pell

2d Sess.

Treaty, Part V, Article 27, S. Res. 263, 90th Cong.,
(1968).

to the criminal law of their own state, pending agreement on an
international code of law governing criminal activities in ocean
space. This is not derived from the principles of the Outer Space
or Antarctic Treaties and contradicts the principle of international criminal jurisdiction as articulated by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in The S. S. "Lotus" (France v.
Turkey).2 3 In that case the Court endorsed the "passive personality" principle of criminal jurisdiction which has been strongly
contested by many nations. It allows a nation's court to take
jurisdiction over a foreigner who has injured one of its
nationals. Part VIII of the Pell Treaty acknowledges as being
the sole basis of jurisdiction the "nationality" principle, a
universally accepted principle which says that jurisdiction is
to the nationality of the person commitdetermined by reference
24
ting the offense.
The most progressive provisions of the Pell Treaty are
those providing for its enforcement. These provisions are found
in Part III entitled Use of the Sea Bed and Subsoil of Ocean Space
and Part VII entitled Sea Guard. Part III, Article 12 creates a
licensing agency which has the power to control who may explore
and exploit ocean space. The licensing agency can also control
the activities of the licensed nations or organizations through
its power to grant and revoke licenses. 2 5 The provision as to
jurisdiction over nationals and national organizations is
similar to those of the Outer Space and Antarctic Treaties in
that it provides, in Part III, Article 14, that a state must make
applications for licenses for its nationals and is responsible for
the authorization and supervision of its nationals. Part III,
Article 14 also recognizes that, when activities are carried on
by an international organization, "...a license may be issued to
26
such organization as if it were a State."1
The agency is also given a judicial function in Part III,
Articles 21 and 22. Disputes are to be settled by the licensing
agency which determines its own procedure. The procedure is
limited only by the requirement that each party is entitled to
27
a "full opportunity to be heard and to present its case."1
If the state fails to comply with the provisions of the
Treaty or with an award made by the licensing agency, the agency
has the power to revoke the states's license under Part III,
Article 20. The state may request a review under the provisions
2 3 Case of the S. S.
2 4 See Dickinson's

"Lotus," [1927] PoC.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
Introductory comment in W. BISHOP,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 463 (2d ed. 1962).
2 5 The powers of the
licensing agency under the Treaty are
consisely listed in Borgese, supra note 27, at 3.
2 6 Pell Treaty,
Part III, Article 14, S. Res. 263, 90th
Cong.172d Sess. (1968).
Id. at Art. 21.

of Part III, Article 23. It is provided that a standing review
panel, consisting of three members appointed by the International
Court of Justice, shall appraise the decision of the agency if a
review is requested within 30 days after receipt by the parties
of notice of the decision. An appeal from the panel's decision
to the International Court of Justice may be taken. The case
is within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice under the provision of paragraph 1, Article 36
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Finally, Part VII of the Pell Treaty creates a Sea Guard
which is to act as a permanent police force of the United Nations
for the purpose of enforcing the principles of the Treaty,
according to Part VII, Article 30. In addition, Part III,
Article 19 provides that all installations and equipment are open
for inspection to the' licensing agency except that, if there is an
objection, they shall be open to the Sea Guard. The powers of
the potentially strong Sea Guard, however, are somewhat mitigated
by Part VII, Article 31 which places control of the Sea Guard in
the hands of the Security Counsel in consultation with the
licensing authority. Practically, this will render the Sea Guard
impotent in cases where issues in the national interests of the
major powers arise. Nonetheless, the licensing agency would still
be in a position, even without the consent of the Security Counsel,
to enforce the provisions of the Treaty or a decision by the
agency by threats of revocation of the state's license.
IV.

CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS

Several new problems are presented by the Pell Treaty and
several existing problems are not solved. First, there are no
guidelines to govern the licensing agency's decision-making
processo 2 8 It might be possible for nations to agree on specific
guidelines after the Treaty has been concluded, but it would be
far more desirable if such guidelines were included in the Treaty.
In particular, questions might arise as to how the agency should
treat past decisions--as law, and therefore binding on the agency,
or merely as evidence of law. Procedural rules of the agency and
the extent of the agency's jurisdiction are other questions which
should be answered, The chances that the Treaty would fail after
its inception would be greatly lessened if the specific items of
possible contention are included within the Treaty and dealt with
in the preliminary negotiations. Therefore, it is suggested that
the Treaty provide guidelines fq the agency's decision-making
processes identical to the guidelines of the International Court
of Justice; the International Court is the ultimate reviewing
court of the agency and the agency must make decisions according
28See Goldie, supra note 2, at 33.

to the precepts of international law and the United Nations
Charter. Therefore, if guidelines similar to those of the
International Court of Justice were provided, jurisdiction of
the agency would depend on consent of the parties, the procedural rules of the agency would be identical to those of the
International Court as set out in Chapter III of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, 2 9 and decisions would have
no binding force as under Article 59 of the Statute. 3 0 These
guidelines would likely be acceptable as they have already been
accepted for the International Court of Justice.
For reasons similar to those supporting the provision of guidelines, the structure of the licensing agency should be specified
in the Treaty. It would not be unreasonable, considering the
strong international control envisioned by the Treaty, to create
a relatively powerful agency. An administrator could be appointed
by the General Assembly in the same way the Secretary-General is
appointed. 3 1 The Administrator would receive no instructions from
any government or from any other authority other than the General
Assembly he would act as an international official. 3 2 Advisors
to the Administrator could be elected by the General Assembly. No
two Advisors, nor a member of the International Court of Justice
and an Advisor, could be nationals of the same state. The
Administrator would have the power to issue licenses and make
initial decisions after consulting the Advisors. A decision by
the Administrator could be vetoed by a contrary vote of the
Advisors. The veto power would be needed as a political buffer
against the power of the Administrator since the Treaty would
probably be otherwise unacceptable.
Some criticism has been leveled at article 14 of the Treaty
which allows an international organization to be licensed "as
if it were a State"o 3 3 If such an organization were aggreived,
it would be allowed to bring an action before the agency and
conceivably before the International Court of Justice which,
according to the argument, would be a violation of the rule that
only states have standing before the International Court of
Justice. 34 This is a misconception of the rule, however. The
principle that only a state has standing before the International
Court of Justice is a legal fiction, used to select those cases
which are properly before the Court; that is, those cases which
'-9IoCoJ. STAT, Chap. 111.
30I.CoJo STATo Art. 59,

31U.No CHARTER Art, 97 provides that the Secretary-General

be appointed by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the
Security Council.
32UoNo CHARTER Art, 100.
3 3 Borgese,
pra note 21, at 3.
34
1oCoJo STAT. Art. 34, para 1.

are governed by principles of public international law. 3 5 If
such a dispute were to arise under the Treaty in its present
form, the International Court of Justice would have little
difficulty in finding that, since the parties to the Treaty
agreed that the organization is to be treated as a state,
then there must have been agreement among the ratifying states
that it be a state for jurisdictional purposes.
It is suggested that there is an unnecessarily close tie
between the Security Council and the creation of the agency
under Part III, Article 12 which subjects the General Assembly's
choice of members of the agency to the approval of the Security
Council. One of the principles on which the Treaty is based,
however, is the recogfiition of "the common heritage of mankind
in ocean space." The interests of all nations would be better
represented in the General Assembly. This is a compelling reason
for allowing the agency and the Sea Guard to be created and controlled by the General Assembly.
The problem of whether a nation may legally exploit the
ocean floor without a license from the agency should also be
considered. This turns on the question of whether the high
seas are characterized as res nullius or res communes. Article 4
of the Treaty states that the principles of international law
are to be applied when interpreting the Treaty. The traditional
principle of international law was that the unexplored regions of
the earth were considered res nullius and were therefore subject
to claims of national sovereigntyo36 There is, however, ample
evidence that the law is changing. The Antarctic Treaty differentiated between land which was or might have been subject to
prior claims and land which had not been claimed, the latter
being immune from claims of sovereignty. The Outer Space Treaty
similarly declares that sovereign claims are not allowed in
furtherance of the principle that exploration of the celestial
3 5 See

Advisory opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered
in the Service of 1he United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174 where
it was said that the United Nations had the capacity to bring an international claim against a government for damages on the ground
that if it had no such standing, the United Nations would be unable to carry out its duties because it could not protect its
agents. The principle might not be applicable to the case of an
international organization licensed under the Pell agency. The
above case is cited to indicate that the rule involves a legal
fiction which should not be cited as a crystalized rule, See
also Jenks, 1945, BRIT. Y.Bo INTLo L. 267.
36 Legal

Status of Eastern Greenland,[1933] P.C.I.J.,
ser. A/B, No. 5 3. Island of Palmas Case (United States v.
Netherlands), Hague Court Reports, Second Series (Scott) 83
(Perm. Ct. Arbo 1932) .

bodies should benefit all mankind. This would seem to imply
that the depths of the high seas, being heretofore unexploitThe
able and inaccessible, are to be considered res communes.
solution to this problem would be an express stipulation in the
Pell Treaty that ocean space is to be considered res communes.
This stipulation would be binding on the states which ratify
the Treaty, and if many nations could be persuaded to ratify
the Treaty, there would be strong evidence that the stipulation
represented consensual law.
Part III, article 15(b) provides that if two or more countries
apply for licenses to explore the same area and if the countries
fail to agree among themselves that either one or more of the
countries will abandon their claim or that they will engage in a
joint working relationship, then the agency may determine which
state shall be granted the license, due regard being given to
encouraging the "development-of the technologically developing
States." 3 7
It is difficult to tell whether the quoted phrase
indicates an intent to help an underdeveloped, nation that is
"technologically developing" from scratch or whether it shows
a preference to the state which is "technologically developing"
the fastest, regardless of the relative state of its technology.
The former interpretation probably should be adopted, since the
encouragement of underdeveloped countries is consistent with the
peaceful purpose of the Treaty. The denial of a license to an
underdeveloped country in favor of a highly developed country
whose technology is expanding more rapidly can hardly be said to
contribute to peace. The underdeveloped country stands to lose
a great deal more relative to its available resources than does
a policy favoring the relatively
the highly developed country;
greater deprivation from the underdeveloped state would breed
international friction.
One final question remains--what shall be the line of demarcation between the high seas area and the continental shelf?
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at
Geneva in 1958,resulted in the approval of four treaties, one
of which was the Convention on the Continental Shelf of
April 29, 1958.38 The Continental Shelf Convention deals with
the exploitation of the resources of the ocean, and the surface
and subsoil of the continental shelf. Article 2(1) provides that
"[T]he coastal state exercises over the continental shelf
3 7 pell

Treaty, Part III, Article 15(b), S. Res. 263, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
3 8 For
the texts of the four treaties entitled 1) Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Continguous Zone, 2) Convention on
the High Seas, 3) Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, and 4) Convention on the
Continental Shelf, see 52 AM. J. INT'L. L. 830-864 (1958).

sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources." Article 1 defines the continental shelf
in dual terms: it is the "...seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of said areas..." The second
part of the definition of the, continental shelf, referring to that
part of the ocean which is "exploitable" and therefore part of the
continental shelf and subject to the sovereign claims of the
coastal state, is a source of difficulty, because the whole of the
ocean floor will probably be exploitable in the not too distant
futureo 3 9 Therefore, one might logically conclude, from a literal
reading of Articles 1 and 2, that the whole of the ocean would be
subject to the sovereign claims of the coastal states. Under
Article 6 of the Covention, 4 0 the ocean would, in the absence of
other agreement, be carved up into boundary lines, equidistant
from shore lines of the various coastal nations. Several reasons
have been advanced as to why this is a desirable result: authority
and responsibility for portions of the ocean would be given to the
various coastal states; a single set of rules and principles would
govern the whole of the ocean; the chances of disputes would be
greatly reduced; and, because of the certainty and stability of
this system, entrepreneurial activity would be greatly encouraged. 4 1
It is suggested, however, that this result is undesirable.
To begin with, the Continental Shelf Treaty, by virtue of its scope
as reflected in the title, is limited to an area adjacent to the
waters over which a nation has a traditional sovereign claim;
the Treaty cannot reasonably be extended to include the entire
ocean area. Additionally, the term "continental shelf" implies
a distinction between the high seas and the relatively shallow
adjacent waters. Another important consideration is that landlocked countries would be completely excluded from sharing in the
wealth of the ocean. Finally, a broad interpretation of "continental
shelf" would work an injustice to a number of nations. The U.S.S.R.
would, for example, have a legal claim on only a relatively small
3 9 See

Goldie, supra note 2. Appendix II of this article
indicates how rapidly the more advanced nations are approaching
capabilities for such exploitation.
40,o.oin the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the
boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured,"
Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 52 AMoJo

INT'L4

860 (1958).
See Young, supra note 8 at 644.
42jI-.
at 644, 645.

portion of the ocean in comparison with her interest and technological ability. Bermuda, in contrast, would own many
thousands of square miles of ocean which she would not be able
to exploit for some time.
Therefore, a logical interpretation of the Continental
Shelf Convention might hinder attempts to solve the problems
of a reasonable and acceptable legal regime for the exploration and exploitation of ocean space. Clearly the Continental Shelf Convention definition is inadequate.
It is also suggested that the Pell definition under
Part VI, Article 29, delimiting that area inside a line at the
600 metre depth to be continental shelf, is equally unsatisfactory. This is so because some coasts drop off very rapidly from
the shore line whereas others extend several hundred miles out from
the shoreline before reaching the 600 metre depth. Simply because
of these fortuitous circumstances, the "shallow coastline" nations
would have a much greater area to exploit. A solution, however,
might be found in alternative limits--one limit in terms of depth
and the other in terms of breadth. For example, the boundary line
of the continental shelf would be a line at the 300 metre depth or
a line 100 miles from the shore line, whichever is greater.
The greatest problem will be, of course, the negotiations
for acceptance of the Pell Treaty. As it stands now, the Treaty
may possibly provide too much international control over the
participating nations to be widely acceptable. On the other hand,
the subject matter of the Treaty is commercial in nature; no
great national security interests are involved. This kind of
treaty is susceptible to a stronger degree of control than
conventions, such as the nuclear test ban treaties, which may
compromise a state's national security. A nation will be much
more willing to accept an adverse economic decision and comply
with the award than a decision infringing on its national
security. In any case, the Pell Treaty is a great step forward
and should be discussed and negotiated at once, in this period
of relative calm on the ocean, rather than later when conflicts
will be less easily solved.
Allen Wood Rigsby

